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authorHolger Dengler <dengler@linutronix.de>2016-11-04 15:41:17 +0100
committerHolger Dengler <dengler@linutronix.de>2016-11-11 14:01:45 +0100
commit3c2306040ec03bcb58dbb0dffa0c11f9901c9302 (patch)
treef7ffd69f5bd07d0b63e6f82545ed7e949e915c7e /security
parentc24a88ae80d8cf22e7fd4825f7a4ceaf157c1ee3 (diff)
security: Add cryptanalysis slides
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/crypto/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--security/crypto/pres_cryptanalysis_en.tex260
2 files changed, 262 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/crypto/Makefile b/security/crypto/Makefile
index eee67f3..1078f26 100644
--- a/security/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/security/crypto/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CRYPTO) += pres_crypto_en.pdf
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_PKI) += pres_pki_en.pdf
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CRYPTO) += pres_crypto_filesystems.pdf
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CRYPTO) += pres_cryptanalysis_en.pdf
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_PKI) += pres_pki_en.pdf
diff --git a/security/crypto/pres_cryptanalysis_en.tex b/security/crypto/pres_cryptanalysis_en.tex
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be5c673
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/crypto/pres_cryptanalysis_en.tex
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+\input{configpres}
+
+\newcommand{\superscript}[1]{\ensuremath{^{\textrm{#1}}}}
+\newcommand{\subscript}[1]{\ensuremath{_{\textrm{#1}}}}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\subsection{Cryptanalysis}
+
+\title{Cryptanalysis}
+\maketitle
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Overview}
+\tableofcontents
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Cryptanalysis}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Goal: Information about Plaintext or Key
+\item Analysis of:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Data (Ciphertext)
+ \item Algorithms
+ \item Environment
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Motivation:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Attack
+ \item Privacy
+ \item Knowledge (corporate-sponsored espionage)
+ \item Secrets (sate-sponsored espionage)
+ \end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Analysis methods and Attacks}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Analysis Methods
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Frequency Analysis
+ \item Linear cryptanalysis
+ \item Differential cryptanalysis
+ \item Integral cryptanalysis
+ \item Mod-n cryptanalysis
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Direct attacks
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Brute force attack
+ \item Dictionary attack
+ \item Rainbow-table attack
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Environmental attacks
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Man-in-the-middle attack
+ \item Replay attack
+ \item Side-channel attack
+ \item Timing attack
+ \end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Scope of attacks}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Ciphertext-only attack
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Attacker knows only some Ciphertexts
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Known-plaintext attack
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Attacker knows some Plaintext and Ciphertext pairs
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Chosen-plaintext attack
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Attacker can choose the encryption input (Pub-Key attacks)
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Chosen-ciphertext attack
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Recover knowledge about key by inserting random ciphertext in
+ decryption path
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Related-key attack
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Analyze plaintext and ciphertext dependencies of a cipher algorithm
+ with similar keys (e.g. only one key bit difference)
+ \end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\subsection{Analysis}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Frequency Analysis}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Main analysis for cipher methods before 1970
+\item Goal: gain information about the cipher algorithm
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item Compare character frequencies in ciphertext and similar plaintext
+ \item Use character exchange table to decode parts or whole ciphertext
+ \end{enumerate}
+\item Result: Knowledge about cipher and key
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Linear Analysis}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Algorithm analysis
+\item published 1992 (by Mitsuru Matsui)
+\item Goal: find linear dependencies in cipher actions
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item find linear dependencies between plaintext, ciphertext and keys bits
+\item use these dependencies together with known-plaintext and
+known-ciphertext attack to derive key bits
+\end{enumerate}
+\item Result: weaken or compromise cipher algorithm
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\subsection{Attacks}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Brute Force}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Classic approach for Key/Password search
+\item Iterate all combinations
+\item Effort: O(n) \\
+ with n: Key/Password Length
+\item Optimizations:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Defined Character namespace
+ \item Use Dictionaries instead of all combinations
+ \item Rainbow-table
+ \item Implementation in FPGA
+ \item Parallel Computing
+ \item Usage of Bot-Nets
+ \end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Rainbow-Table}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Focus on password hashes
+\item Problem:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Full pre-computed hash lookup-tables are very space consuming
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Solution:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Table of starting- and end-points of hash-chains
+ \item Iterate the chains with a given hash
+ \end{itemize}
+\item Hash-Chain:
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item Hash function: password -> hash
+ \item Reduction function: hash -> new password
+ \end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Rainbow-Table II}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Rainbow-table calculation
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item Start with password P\subscript{0} and calculate hash H\subscript{0}
+ \item Reduction function calculates P\subscript{1} from H\subscript{0}
+ \item Calculate hash H\subscript{1} from P\subscript{1}
+ \item Repeat step 2 and 3 n times
+ \item Store P\subscript{0} and P\subscript{n}
+ \item Repeat steps 1 to 5 with another password
+ \end{enumerate}
+\item Usage:
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item Start with a hash value H\subscript{x}
+ \item Reduction function calculates P\subscript{x+1} from H\subscript{x}
+ \item Compare P\subscript{x+1} with the chain endpoints
+ \item If P\subscript{x+1} does not match, hash P\subscript{x+1} to
+ H\subscript{x+1} and restart at step 2
+ \item Otherwise take the matching hash-chain and recalculate it until
+ P\subscript{x}
+ \end{enumerate}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Rainbow-Table III}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Calculation:
+\end{itemize}
+\begin{figure}[h]
+\centering
+\includegraphics[width=8cm]{images/sec_rainbowtable_calc.png}
+\end{figure}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Start with Hash c89003:
+ \begin{enumerate}
+ \item R(c89003) = kheohn, no match
+ \item H(kehohn) = 2cff73
+ \item R(2cff73) = lizbus, \textbf{MATCH} in chain aaaaaa
+ \item Recalculate chain aaaaaa until H(srlems) equals c89003
+ \end{enumerate}
+\item Result: \textbf{srlems} is the wanted password for hash \textbf{c89003}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Man-in-the-Middle}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Attack against Key-exchange protocols (e.g. TLS)
+\item Relay between two communication partners
+\item Forward information but replace the keys
+\end{itemize}
+\begin{figure}[h]
+\centering
+\includegraphics[width=6cm]{images/sec_mitm.png}
+\end{figure}
+
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Replay}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Communication attack
+\item Capture e.g. Authentication attack an replay it later
+\item Mitigation: Timestamp authentication information
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\subsection{Summary}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Summary}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Cipher algorithm classification with known analysis methods
+\item Weaken or break Cipher algorithms with attacks
+\item Attacks may compromise systems
+\item Implementations may allow side-channel attacks
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+% ----------------------------
+\subsection*{}
+\input{tailpres}